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UPDATES FROM THE INTERNATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONALIZED CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
ICC AUTHORIZES PROSECUTOR’S
REQUEST TO OPEN INVESTIGATION IN
CÔTE D’IVOIRE
On October 3, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber
III of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) authorized Prosecutor Luis MorenoOcampo’s request to open an investigation in Côte d’Ivoire. In his request, the
Prosecutor sought authority to investigate
crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction committed during Côte d’Ivoire’s post-election
violence in 2010-2011 between forces
loyal to incumbent President Alassane
Ouattara and those loyal to now-ousted
former President Laurent Gbagbo. Three
thousand people were killed, 72 disappeared, 520 were arbitrarily detained, and
100 cases of rape were reported. The
authorization is based on a finding that the
Prosecutor established a reasonable basis
to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC had been committed by
both pro-Ouattara and pro-Gbagbo forces.
Though Côte d’Ivoire is not a State Party
to the ICC, President Ouattara confirmed
its acceptance of ICC jurisdiction, most
recently in May 2011. Article 12(3) of
the Rome Statute—the ICC’s founding
treaty—allows non-States Parties to accept
ICC jurisdiction on an ad hoc basis.
With elections for the next Chief
Prosecutor approaching in December, the
investigation presents one of Prosecutor
Ocampo’s final opportunities to bolster
the legitimacy of his office, strengthen its
legacy, and provide a positive starting point
for his successor. To do so, the Prosecutor
must develop a coherent and well-executed
investigation strategy that communicates
the ICC’s mandate to victims and affected
communities who seek justice, and sets
the tone for the prosecution of perpetrators throughout Côte d’Ivoire. In light of a
recent report by Human Rights Watch, the
investigation in Côte d’Ivoire has implications for the credibility of the ICC and
presents an opportunity to improve on past
techniques.
The report found that the absence of
a well-communicated and coherent inves-

tigative strategy within the Office of the
Prosecutor (OTP) threatened its independence and impartiality during the course
of investigations in the past. In these prior
situations, the OTP failed to investigate all
sides of a conflict or issued inconsistent
charges for similar crimes. In other cases,
it failed to trace responsibility for crimes to
the higher levels of government. Together,
these discrepancies foster perceptions that
the ICC is not independent from government control or that it favors one group
over another. The failure to move forward
with investigations of certain subjects creates an impression that they are innocent, severely damaging the restorative
efforts of affected communities who know
these individuals to be responsible and had
expected the Court to expose the truth.
In fulfilling its investigative mandate,
the OTP must identify patterns of crimes
and trace the chain of responsibility to individuals most responsible for the crimes.
The principles of independence and impartiality require the OTP to investigate alleged
perpetrators on all sides, which in the situation in Côte d’Ivoire includes agents and
forces loyal to President Ouattara, many
of whom now occupy key government
positions. Yet the OTP is highly dependent
on government cooperation while inside a
country to fulfill its document collection
and witness interview obligations, which
makes it difficult to effectively investigate
and prosecute such upper-level individuals.
Prosecutor Ocampo must therefore
demonstrate in his final months that he can
strike a delicate balance in Côte d’Ivoire —
one that achieves the goals of impartiality
and independence while maintaining the
degree of state cooperation that is critical
for a complete and thorough investigation. On one hand, the failure to carry out
an impartial investigation of those most
responsible from all parties to the conflict
risks delivering the kind of “victor’s justice” that neglects victims and fails to deter
those who might view crimes as a means
to victory. On the other hand, the OTP
must remain unbiased without alienating
state officials; otherwise, those implicated
may frustrate the investigation process
out of self-interest, restricting access to
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evidence, witnesses, and affected communities. Implicated officials might also
threaten the safety of victims who wish to
participate as witnesses.
The investigation in Côte d’Ivoire
demands an independent and impartial
approach to ensure not only that affected
communities experience meaningful justice, but also that the ICC avoids costly
perceptions of bias and maintains support from the international community in
its efforts to confront impunity in future
situations. The OTP can foster cooperation by strictly adhering to core values
of justice and fairness, which will attract
allies within Côte d’Ivoire who are willing
to collaborate. The OTP might also openly
denounce non-cooperation to encourage
the international community to exert pressure on the state to fulfill its obligation to
cooperate with the Court. In all, Prosecutor
Ocampo must seize this opportunity, as the
future of the Court may depend on it.

ICC APPEALS CHAMBER CONFIRMS
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CASES IN THE
SITUATION OF KENYA
On August 30, 2011, the ICC Appeals
Chamber confirmed the admissibility of
The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto,
Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap
Sang and The Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi
Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and
Mohammed Hussein Ali. These decisions
underscore the ICC’s commitment to the
principle of complementarity as outlined
in Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute, the
founding document of the Court. Under
Article 17, the Court may hear a case only
after finding that a State with domestic
jurisdiction is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute.
On March 31, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber
II granted the Office of the Prosecutor’s
(OTP) request to open an investigation
propio motu (“by its own volition”) into
alleged crimes against humanity in Kenya,
committed during the post-election violence that left approximately 1,100 people
dead, 35,000 injured, and up to 600,000
forcibly displaced in 2007-2008. On March
8, 2011, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued sum-
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monses to appear for six Kenyan nationals
accused of crimes against humanity under
Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute.
On March 31, 2011, the government of
Kenya, a State Party to the Rome Statute
since 2005, filed applications challenging
the admissibility of both cases. On May 30,
2011, Pre-Trial Chamber II issued rejections to these applications, and on June
6, 2011, the Kenyan government filed an
appeal, citing Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome
Statute. In filing its appeal, the Kenyan
government argued that the Court had
applied the incorrect standard to determine
whether Kenya was fulfilling its duty to
investigate the case under Article 17(1)(a),
and that the Court had ignored or misinterpreted evidence that investigations were
ongoing in Kenya.
On August 30, 2011, the Appeals
Chamber rejected the appeal and confirmed the ruling of Pre-Trial Chamber
II. In clarifying Article 17(1)(a), the Court
ruled that the standard used to determine
whether a case is being genuinely investigated depends on the stage of the proceedings. After issuing an arrest warrant or
summons to appear, the Court applies the
“same person/same conduct” test, which
ascertains whether the state has itself taken
concrete steps to determine whether the
same individual is responsible for substantially the same conduct as alleged in the
case before the ICC. In the present case,
the Court found that the Kenyan government had failed to demonstrate that it had
taken specific and concrete steps to investigate the same individual and the same conduct, adding: “It is not sufficient merely to
assert that investigations are ongoing.”
The Appeals Chamber’s decision is thus
an affirmation of the principle of complementarity and a clear declaration that both
cases will proceed within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The Kenyan Section of
the International Commission of Jurists
has always supported ICC control of proceedings, arguing that Kenya needs to
address issues such as poor political leadership, judicial and police reforms, and the
need for a more robust witness protection
program before local justice mechanisms
would be capable of trying these cases.
In its admissibility challenge, the
Kenyan government addressed many of
these issues by referencing reforms codified in the new Constitution, among them
a Bill of Rights designed to strengthen

fair trial rights, the creation of new offices
and procedures to ensure judicial independence, and the inclusion of Rome Statute
crimes in national jurisdiction. The government also laid out plans for a bottom-up
investigative process that would focus first
on suspects at a lower level, and then work
its way up to the individuals charged before
the ICC. Though the Pre-Trial Chamber II
and the Appeals Chamber welcomed these
measures, they stated that neither reforms
nor plans for future investigations met
the requirements to prove actual ongoing
investigations of the same individuals and
for the same conduct.
The Court’s decision confirming the
admissibility of both cases in the situation
in Kenya furthers the Court’s goal of providing an impartial forum for prosecution
when national courts are found unwilling
or unable to do so. To effectively fill this
role, the Court’s responsibility extends
beyond the proceedings to ensuring that
the restorative effects of justice reach geographically distant victims and affected
communities.With Kenya’s 2012 elections
approaching, the proceedings send a strong
message to potential perpetrators of violence and to the international community
at large that the ICC is standing by to
investigate and, if necessary, prosecute
should Kenya again experience violence.
The principle of complementarity allows
for the truth behind alleged crimes to be
revealed, one way or another.
Claire Grandison, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the International Criminal
Court for the Human Rights Brief.

AD HOC TRIBUNALS
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA RECEIVES FIRST
REFERRAL CASE FROM ICTR
On June 28, 2011, the United Nations
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR) announced its referral of the
first war crimes case, that of Jean-Bosco
Uwinkindi, to the Republic of Rwanda.
This comes after many years of determined
efforts by the Rwandan government to
create an impartial court system that is
capable of detaining, representing, and trying indicted persons under internationally
recognized standards. While the referral
is not a carte blanche endorsement of the
Rwandan judicial system, it indicates cautious approval of Rwanda’s efforts thus far
37

to align its judicial system to international
standards, and will be a litmus test for
future referrals, which could ease the caseload of the ICTR in compliance with the
goals of its Completion Strategy.
The ICTR modeled its referral process
after the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), which
has successfully referred thirteen cases to
national jurisdictions. As set forth in UN
Resolution 1503 (2003), a culminating element of the ICTR’s Completion Strategy
is empowering national judicial systems
to promote the rule of law. When a state
maintains a level of juridical competence
that protects the rights of the accused, per
Article 20 of the ICTR Statute, the ICTR
may facilitate the transfer the cases of
intermediate and lower-rank individuals.
Article 20 requires that the accused have
equality before the court, a fair and public
hearing, a presumption of innocence, and
minimum guarantees of fairness during
trial. The referral process then falls under
Rule 11 bis of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence for the ICTR, which requires
that a specially designated Trial Chamber
assess the state’s compliance with Article
20. The state must have a penal code
and penalty structure in line with ICTR
standards, which includes prohibiting the
death penalty for all referred cases, protecting witnesses, and providing adequate
detention facilities. After granting a referral order, the ICTR transfers prosecution
materials and the accused to the state, and
may order observers to monitor and report
on the proceedings and facilities, revoking
the referral at any time prior to judgment
if necessary.
To aid in the Uwinkindi referral decision, the ICTR Trial Chamber accepted
amicus curiae briefs from the Rwandan
Government and several non-governmental
organizations. The organizations expressed
concerns that Rwandan practices do not
always respect written law. For example,
in a radio interview after Uwinkindi’s
arrest, Rwanda’s Minister of Justice violated Uwinkindi’s right to presumption
of innocence, saying he “would be a big
catch” since he was “high up in the hierarchy” for planning and executing genocide.
Further, the briefs noted that the public
announcement of Uwinkindi’s conviction
in absentia by a Rwandan Gacaca Court
in 2009 would make witnesses reluctant
to testify, even though the conviction was
vacated. These concerns are particularly
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relevant, as five prior ICTR referral applications were denied for similar concerns,
including capital punishment, detention
conditions, and witness protection.
However, the amicus briefs also illustrate Rwanda’s significant leaps forward.
In 2007, Rwanda abolished the death penalty, and has since adopted and amended
Transfer Laws for accepting cases from
the ICTR, according the accused a presumption of innocence, bringing detention facilities in line with UN General
Assembly Resolution 43/173, and establishing witness protection standards. Two
witness protection programs now provide
immunity for testimony. Some witnesses
still express fear of being targeted should
they testify, but they now have the option to
testify via video link, deposition, or before
a judge in another state.
These new witness protection measures
reflect a reinforced standard of judicial
fairness, providing for valuable testimony
that might otherwise be unavailable for
fear of reprisal. Moreover, Rwanda can
now draw from its own experience with
genocide trials in its local Gacaca courts
and its High Court.
While Rwanda must continue to address
the concerns of the amicus briefs, the
ICTR is satisfied that the new measures
will ensure Uwinkindi has a fair trial.
The African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, an independent organization affirmed by the Trial Chambers, will
monitor the effectiveness of the new measures throughout the trial, ideally mitigating the risk of an unfair trial. In their own
amicus brief, the Rwandan Government
states that until the Transfer Laws have
been tested by cases from the ICTR, they
deserve a presumption of good faith, and
this is exactly what the ICTR has given
them.

FINAL ICTY FUGITIVE CAPTURED:
WHAT’S NEXT?
The July 20, 2011 announcement of
the arrest of Goran Hadži , the last of
161 persons indicted by the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), marks a turning point
in the Tribunal’s mission. The Tribunal
was established as an ad hoc judiciary,
contingent upon the restoration of peace
in the region in accordance with United
Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution
803 (1993). Accordingly, in response to the

demonstrated judicial competence of the
countries that emerged from the former
Yugoslavia, the ICTY began to implement
its Completion Strategy in 2003, no longer
adding cases to its docket after 2004. The
Completion Strategy, as adopted by the
UN Security Council, requires that the
ICTY focus its efforts on the formidable
task of building in-country judicial capacity, working with and dependent on the
national judiciaries.
Passing the torch of the ICTY to countries in the former Yugoslavia is a twopronged effort. First, as outlined in UN
Resolution 1534 (2004), the ICTY and
the international community must work
to build the capacity of national courts to
try war crimes cases fairly and effectively.
Intricately bound with this task is the second: the transfer of the vast amount of legal
documentation, evidence, rules of evidence
and procedure, and specialized experience
from the ICTY to the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
As set forth in UN Resolution 1503
(2003), a culminating element of the
ICTR’s Completion Strategy is empowering national judicial systems to promote
the rule of law. The principal effort in this
regard is the War Crimes Justice Project
(WCJP). A joint effort of the ICTY, the
Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights at the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE/ODIHR), and the United Nations
Interregional Crime and Justice Research
Institute (UNICRI), with 4 million of
funding from the European Union (EU),
the WCJP formed in late 2010 after a ninemonth needs assessment to facilitate the
transfer of the ICTY’s skills and resources.
To meet the identified needs, the WCJP
performs several functions. First, it translates key proceedings from the ICTY into
Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. In total,
60,000 pages will be translated by the
end of 2011. Second, the WCJP has coordinated thirty-one professional development sessions in the former Yugoslavia for
legal professionals, judges, and prosecutors on various jurisprudential principles
embraced by the Tribunal, while acquainting the countries with the Tribunal’s legal
research tools. The ICTY has also hosted
local forums for judges to exchange expertise on legal challenges and procedural
tools. Finally, the WCJP is working with
the OSCE to develop country-specific curricula on international humanitarian law
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tailored to each legal system, training
instructors to continue the WCJP’s work
autonomously. Ultimately, the WCJP will
make a compilation of legal precedent
available for war crimes trials in the former Yugoslavia, and provide the tools and
expertise necessary for local professionals
to use it effectively.
Transferring the work of the ICTY both
demands and enables a competent national
judiciary. Several specialized chambers for
war crimes prosecution within the former
Yugoslavia now provide direct counterparts with which the ICTY can work. The
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, with the
cooperation of the ICTY, formed a War
Crimes Chamber that has successfully tried
and convicted war criminals under its own
criminal code. Ten indicted individuals
have been transferred to this court from the
ICTY. Croatia is still undergoing massive
judicial reform, but has made considerable
progress, establishing war crimes chambers in county courts. In 2003, Croatia
adopted new witness protection laws,
and in 2005 it added a department in its
Ministry of Justice to work with witnesses
of war crimes. To date, Croatia has tried
one transferred case from the ICTY, and
it is working with the ICTY to prosecute
others locally. Serbia has also made significant progress, setting up a War Crimes
Chamber, and working with the ICTY on
transfer cases. Through the Office of the
War Crimes Prosecutor, Serbia now issues
its own indictments and convictions, successfully prosecuting 383 persons to date.
The greatest substantive contribution
of the ICTY to the former Yugoslavia and
the rest of the world is the vast amount
of precedent for international war crimes
adjudication. The international community, and in particular the International
Criminal Court and other ad hoc tribunals,
will continue to interpret and build on this
precedent. However, the separate procedural contribution of the ICTY exemplified in these capacity building efforts is a
success in its own right. It will ultimately
increase trust in the competence of national
judiciaries to try war criminals under the
same standards of fairness and impartiality
promoted by the ICTY.
Benjamin Watson, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the Ad Hoc Tribunals for the
Human Rights Brief.
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JUDGMENT SUMMARIES: INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA
THE PROSECUTOR V. NYIRAMASUHUKO,
ET AL., TRIAL JUDGMENT, CASE NO.
ICTR-98-42-T
On June 24, 2011, Trial Chamber II
of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda issued its approximately 1500
page judgment in the case commonly
known as the “Butare Trial,” against six
Rwandans who held positions of authority
in the préfecture of Butare in Rwanda during the 1994 genocide. The six accused—
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Arsène Shalom
Ntahobali, Sylvain Nsabimana, Alphonse
Nteziryayo, Joseph Kanyabashi, and Elie
Ndayambaje—was each convicted of genocide based on his or her role in helping to
formulate and implement a government
plan to massacre the Tutsis in Butare,
one of the most populated préfectures in
Rwanda, and the area with the highest
percentage of Tutsis. Among the other
charges on which the accused were convicted were conspiracy to commit genocide
(Nyiramasuhuko), direct and public incitement to commit genocide (Nteziryayo,
Kanyabashi, and Ndayambaje), extermination as a crime against humanity
(Nyiramasuhuko, Ntahobali, Kanyabashi,
and Ndayambaje), rape as a crime against
humanity (Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali),
persecution as a crime against humanity
(Nyiramasuhuko, Ntahobali, Nsabimana,
Kanyabashi, and Ndayambaje), violence to life, health, and the physical or
mental well-being of persons as a war
crime (Nyiramasuhuko, Nsabimana,
Kanyabashi, and Ndayambaje), and outrages upon personal dignity as a war crime
(Nyiramasuhuko and Ntahobali). Each was
acquitted of other inhumane acts as a
crime against humanity, either because the
underlying acts forming the basis for the
charge fell “squarely within other crimes
against humanity” for which the accused
was convicted, or did not rise to the level
of crimes against humanity. The Chamber
sentenced Nyiramasuhuko, Ntahobali,
and Ndayambaje to life imprisonment,
Nsabimana to twenty-five years’ imprisonment, Nteziryayo to thirty years’ imprisonment, and Kanyabashi to thirty-five years’
imprisonment.
The Butare Trial and judgment are
notable for a number of reasons. First, the
trial was particularly lengthy and complex,

lasting ten years and involving the creation
of more than 125,000 transcript pages,
the production of approximately 13,000
pages of documents into evidence, and
the testimony of 189 witnesses. Due to the
lengthy nature of the trial, several of the
accused either filed separate motions with
the Chamber arguing that their rights to be
tried without undue delay had been violated, or raised this claim in their closing
arguments to the Chamber. However, the
Chamber dismissed these claims, explaining that what constitutes “undue” delay is
determined on case-by-case basis by looking at the length of delay, the complexity
of proceedings, the conduct of parties,
the conduct of legal authorities, and any
prejudice which accrued to the accused
as a result. Referencing its decisions in
Nahimana, et al. and Bagosara, et al., in
which the Chamber had found that detention of more than seven-and-a-half years
and eleven years, respectively, were not
“undue” because of the complexity of
the cases, the Chamber reached a similar
conclusion with respect to the Butare Trial,
stressing not only the large number of witnesses, but also the fact that six different
defense teams had to cross-examine each
witness and present its own case.
Another notable feature of the Butare
Trial and judgment is that Pauline
Nyiramasuhuko, the former Minister of
Family and Women’s Development in
Rwanda, was the first female accused to be
brought before any international criminal
tribunal, as well as the first woman to be
convicted of genocide and rape—both as
a crime against humanity and as the war
crime of outrages upon personal dignity—
in any international criminal tribunal. In
regard to the charges of rape, the Trial
Chamber convicted both Nyiramasuhuko
and her son, Ntahobali, who was a student
and part-time manager of Hotel Ihuliro
during the 1994 genocide, of bearing superior responsibility for the rapes of a number of Tutsi refugees who had taken shelter
at the Butare Préfecture Office (BPO).
Specifically, the Chamber found that
Nyiramasuhuko brought Interhamwe soldiers who were under her effective control
to the BPO and, in many cases, ordered the
soldiers to rape Tutsi women before loading them onto trucks and taking them to
various places in Butare to be killed. Given
the fact that the Chamber found that the
evidence established Nyiramasuhuko had
ordered the rapes, the Chamber expressed
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the view that the Prosecution had made
a “serious omission” by failing to charge
her with both direct and superior responsibility for rape. By contrast, Ntahobali
was convicted of rape as a crime against
humanity and as the war crime of outrages
upon personal dignity not only as a superior, but also for his role as a principal
perpetrator of rapes against several women,
and for ordering and aiding and abetting
the rape and gang rapes of Tutsi women.
The Chamber also repeatedly admonished
the Prosecution for its failure to adequately plead rape as genocide, noting
that while rape featured prominently in the
Prosecution’s Indictment, it was pled only
as a crime against humanity and the war
crime of outrages upon personal dignity.
Furthermore, the Chamber found that the
Prosecution failed to cure the defective
pleading through its Pre-Trial Brief and
Opening Statement. Thus, although the
Chamber found that the evidence established that the bodily and mental harm
inflicted by the rapes perpetrated or supported by the accused was “of such a serious nature as to threaten the destruction in
whole or in part of the Tutsi ethnic group,”
it could not consider the acts of rape in support of the charges of genocide. Notably,
the Chamber did discuss the evidence
presented at trial regarding acts of rape in
the course of its findings on genocide in
order to convey the entire set of facts in a
coherent fashion, but noted each time that
the rapes were not taken into account when
assessing genocide.
Yet another interesting facet of
the Butare Trial judgment is the Trial
Chamber’s finding that Nsabimana, who
was préfet of Butare during the relevant
events, aided and abetted crimes committed at the Butare Préfecture Office through
his failure to fulfill his legal duty to prevent the crimes. Specifically, the Chamber
convicted Nsabimana of aiding and abetting genocide, extermination and persecution as crimes against humanity, and the
war crime of violence to life, health, and
the physical or mental well-being of persons based on its finding that he had a legal
duty to prevent the killing of Tutsis taking
refuge at the BPO. The Chamber began its
analysis of Nsabimana’s liability by stating that an accused may be responsible for
aiding and abetting in two different ways:
(i) by positive acts, including providing
tacit approval and encouragement; or (ii)
by omission, namely failing to discharge
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a legal duty to act. While the first form
of aiding and abetting liability seems to
require the presence of the accused at or
near the scene of the crime, the Chamber
explained, the latter only requires that the
accused had the ability to fulfill his or her
duty; that the failure of the accused to do so
assisted, encouraged, or lent moral support
to the perpetration of a crime; and that the
failure to act had a substantial impact on
the realization of that crime. Thus, the fact
that Nsabimana was not present at the BPO
when the attacks that formed the basis for
the charges against him were committed
did not preclude the Chamber from finding him responsible as an aider and abettor.
In terms of his legal obligation to prevent
the attacks at the BPO, the Chamber first
explained that the Rwandan Penal Code
imposes a general obligation on every
citizen to provide assistance to persons in
danger and provides that failure to do so is
a criminal offense. While recognizing that
the Code also provides that a risk to oneself
may serve as justification for a failure to
act, the Chamber held that the danger to
any one person in a position of authority
does not outweigh the violence suffered
by thousands of people that “affects… [h]
umanity as a whole.” The Chamber also
found that Rwandan domestic law required
Nsabimana, as préfet, to ensure the security
of people within the Butare préfecture.
Lastly, the Chamber noted that the laws
and customs of war imposed a legal duty
to protect civilians against acts or threats of
violence, citing in particular to provisions
of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions. With respect to Nsabimana’s
assistance to, and substantial effect on,
the perpetration of crimes at the BPO, the
Chamber noted that many people took
refuge at the BPO precisely because they
believed that the préfet would help them,
but in reality, Nsabimana not only failed to
intervene, but directly declined requests for
assistance. The Chamber also stressed that,
when Nsabimana did eventually requisition
forces to stand guard at the BPO in earlyto mid-June 1994, further attacks were
prevented. Had he taken such action earlier
in time, the Chamber concluded, he could
have prevented, at least in part, crimes that
the Chamber characterized as “among the
worst” recounted before the ICTR.
Brynn Weinstein, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine

Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

THE PROSECUTOR V. JEAN-BAPTISTE
GATETE, TRIAL JUDGMENT, CASE NO.
ICTR-2000-61-T
Trial Chamber III of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda issued
its judgment in the case against JeanBaptiste Gatete on March 31, 2011. Gatete,
who was a prominent member of the
Hutu-dominated National Revolutionary
Movement for Development of Rwanda
and served as the director of the Ministry
of Women and Family Affairs during the
country’s 1994 genocide, was found guilty
of genocide and extermination as a crime
against humanity, resulting in a single sentence of life imprisonment. The Chamber
ruled that he was responsible for the
deaths of hundreds—if not thousands—of
Rwanda’s Tutsis based on his role organizing and coordinating mass killings by distributing weapons and ordering members
of the Interahamawe, a civilian militia,
to carry out extensive assaults on Tutsis.
Although the Prosecution also charged
Gatete with rape as a crime against humanity based on a number of alleged incidents
in which the accused ordered members of
the Interahamwe to rape Tutsis, the Trial
Chamber determined with respect to each
of these incidents that the Prosecution had
failed to establish Gatete’s responsibility
for the rapes beyond a reasonable doubt
and thus Gatete was acquitted of rape as a
crime against humanity.
Along with challenging the Prosecution’s
evidence relating to the charges against
him, Gatete’s Defense team raised a number of challenges relating to the fairness
of proceedings. First, the Defense argued
that Gatete’s right to trial without undue
delay had been violated, given that he was
arrested on September 11, 2002 and over
seven years lapsed before his trial commenced on October 20, 2009. In addressing this challenge, the Chamber noted that
the right to be tried without undue delay
is established by Article 20 (4)(c) of the
statute of the ICTR and that a number of
factors are relevant in determining whether
a delay was undue, including: “(a) the
length of the delay; (b) the complexity of
the proceedings…; (c) the conduct of the
parties; (d) the conduct of the authorities involved; and (e) the prejudice to the
40

accused...” The Chamber weighs these factors on a case-by-case basis, and considers
the totality of circumstances surrounding
the undue delay. Turning to the case before
it, the Chamber first recognized that the
pre-trial delay of over seven years was substantial. However, the Chamber balanced
the length of the delay with the other factors mentioned above. Regarding the complexity of the proceedings, the Chamber
considered multiple sub-factors including
“the number of accused, the number of
witnesses, the quantity of the evidence, and
the complexity of the facts and of the law.”
While the case involved only one accused,
the Chamber stressed that, together, the
Prosecution and Defense called forty-nine
witnesses before the Chamber and presented 146 exhibits. There was also an evidentiary on-site visit to Rwanda. Moreover,
the Chamber noted that the allegations of
genocide, complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, and the crimes
against humanity of extermination, murder,
and rape involved complex issues of law
and fact. Moreover, while the Chamber did
cite to “instances of delay on the part of the
Prosecution” for which the Chamber found
no justification, it also determined that the
accused suffered no prejudice as a result
of these delays. Indeed, in the opinion of
the Chamber, the Defense’s failure to challenge the length of proceedings until its
Closing Brief demonstrated that there was
minimal—if any—prejudice as a consequence of the delay. Finally, the Chamber
stressed that, once the trial commenced, it
was conducted extremely expeditiously. In
sum, the Chamber ruled that, after considering the above factors, Gatete’s right to
trial without undue delay was not violated.
The Defense also argued that the disclosure of the identities of a number of protected witnesses only thirty days prior to
the start of trial adversely affected Gatete’s
ability to prepare his defence pursuant to
Article 20(4)(b) of the ICTR Statute. In
response, the Trial Chamber noted not only
that it had a statutory duty to “provide for
the protection of victims and witnesses,”
but also that the Pre-Trial Chamber had
determined that the Prosecution had presented “persuasive evidence of the volatile security situation in Rwanda and of
potential threats against Rwandans living
in other countries, which could give rise
to a justified and real fear that disclosure
of their participation in the Tribunal’s proceedings would threaten their safety and

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 7
security.” The Chamber also stressed that
the Defense was not alleging that the decision to grant protective measures was an
abuse of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s discretion. Finally, the Chamber noted that the
Defense had failed to demonstrate how the
fact that the identities were not disclosed
until thirty days before the start of trial
harmed its preparation. As a result, the
Chamber dismissed the claim.
Lastly, the Defense argued that Gatete’s
right to a fair trial was prejudiced by the
fact that eight out of the thirty days of
trial proceedings were conducted in the
absence of one of the three Trial Chamber
judges. While recognizing that Rule 15bis
of the ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence permits the Trial Chamber to
hold proceedings in the absence of a judge
where the interests of justice require, the
Defense argued that Gatete suffered prejudice because: (i) the testimony of twelve
witnesses had to be viewed by the absent
judge by way of video-recording, which
does not allow for the same assessment of a
witness’s credibility as live testimony; and
(ii) the absence of one judge “has an impact
on the level of questioning from the Bench
during trial.” The Trial Chamber rejected
the claim of prejudice, however, noting that
the Defense had not demonstrated that the
remaining judges of the Chamber abused
their discretion under Rule 15bis in determining that the interests of justice required
a continuation of the trial. Furthermore,
the Chamber noted that, while the preference is for each judge to hear live testimony from witnesses, there is no absolute
requirement that testimony be presented
in such a manner, and in any event, a witness’s in-court demeanor is not the sole
factor relevant to determining credibility.
Finally, the Chamber highlighted the fact
that the Defense had not raised objections
to the continuation of proceedings pursuant
to Rule 15bis at the time and that it did not
move to recall any witnesses following the
return of the absent judge.
Having dismissed the Defense’s claims
regarding Gatete’s fair trial rights, the
Chamber went on to evaluate the charges
against Gatete and determined, as mentioned above, that he bore responsibility for
the crimes of genocide and extermination
as a crime against humanity. In sentencing Gatete, the Chamber considered the
gravity of the offenses with which he was
convicted, as well as aggravating and miti-

gating circumstances, and decided upon a
single sentence of thirty years.
Adam Dembling, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

THARCISSE RENZAHO V. THE
PROSECUTOR, APPEALS JUDGMENT,
CASE NO. ICTR-97-31-A
On April 1, 2011, the Appeals Chamber
of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda issued its judgment in the case
against Tharcisse Renzaho, préfect of
Kigali-Ville préfecture and a colonel in the
Rwandan army during the 1994 genocide.
The Trial Chamber had convicted Renzaho
of genocide, murder and rape as crimes
against humanity, and murder and rape as
serious violations of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions and of Additional
Protocol II, sentencing him to life imprisonment. Although the Appeals Chamber
granted two of Renzaho’s thirteen grounds
of appeal, it affirmed the Trial Chamber’s
life sentence.
The first of Renzaho’s two successful grounds of appeal related to the Trial
Chamber’s decision to convict him of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes on the basis of his superior responsibility for repeated acts of rape committed against three women by Interahamwe,
policemen, and soldiers in the Rugenge
sector of Kigali-Ville. Specifically,
Renzaho argued that the Trial Chamber
convicted him of on the basis of facts not
properly pleaded in the Indictment, which,
according to Renzaho, lacked detailed
information regarding the dates, locations,
and names of the victims and perpetrators
underlying the Prosecution’s rape charges.
The Prosecution contended that although
the Rugenge sector was not expressly mentioned in the Indictment, the Indictment
alleged that between April and July 1994,
Renzaho’s subordinates raped Tutsi women
and girls throughout Kigali-Ville and
forced them to perform sexual acts in
exchange for their safety. Additionally,
the Prosecution argued that Renzaho
received clear, consistent, and timely information detailing the factual basis of the
rape charges against him by way of the
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Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief. In reviewing these claims, the Appeals Chamber
began by recalling that, because Renzaho
was charged as a superior under Article
6(3) of the Statute of the Tribunal, four
categories of the material facts must have
been pleaded in the Indictment: (i) facts
establishing that Renzaho was the superior
of sufficiently identified subordinates over
whom he had effective control and for
whose acts he was alleged to be responsible; (ii) facts describing the criminal acts
committed by those for whom Renzaho
was alleged to be responsible; (iii) facts
establishing that the accused knew or had
reason to know of the criminal acts; and
(iv) facts establishing that Renzaho failed
to take necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent the criminal acts or to punish the
persons who committed them. Ultimately,
the Appeals Chamber determined that the
Indictment was defective because it failed
to plead the facts establishing that Renzaho
knew or had reason to know of the rapes
forming the basis for the charges. It also
found that the Prosecution’s Pre-Trial Brief
failed to cure the defect because it did not
clearly indicate that Renzaho’s encouragement of the rapes was the key fact that
formed the basis for his criminal liability
as a superior. Finally, the Appeals Chamber
concluded that the defective pleading
constituted a prejudice against Renzaho
because his ability to prepare his defense
was materially impaired. During the trial,
Renzaho’s defense did not understand that
the encouragement of the rapes was a key
element to the Prosecution’s case and, thus,
did not appropriately object to a witness’s
testimony stating that Renzaho encouraged the rapes. Therefore, the Appeals
Chamber held that the Trial Chamber erred
in convicting Renzaho and reversed his
convictions for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes to the extent the
convictions were based on these rapes.
The Appeals Chamber, by majority,
also partially granted Renzaho’s fifth
ground of appeal, which raised several
challenges to the Trial Chamber’s finding
that Renzaho was guilty of genocide based
on killings that occurred at roadblocks
set up throughout Kigali-Ville. In particular, a majority of the Appeals Chamber
was persuaded by Renzaho’s challenge to
the Trial Chamber’s finding, by way of
inference, that he ordered the killing of
Tutsis at roadblocks. The Trial Chamber
had reached this conclusion, despite the

Grandison et al.: Updates from the International and Internationalized Criminal Cou
fact that there was no explicit evidence
that Renzaho had ordered the killings, by
noting that the evidence established that
Renzaho had ordered the establishment of
the roadblocks, facilitated the acquisition
of weapons for distribution to the civilian
population, and sanctioned the killings at
the roadblocks. Based on this evidence,
the Trial Chamber concluded that Renzaho
“must have equally” ordered the killings
at roadblocks. In reviewing this finding,
the Appeals Chamber first recalled that,
while ordering, as a mode of responsibility, can be inferred from circumstantial
evidence, it must be the only reasonable
inference available. Here, the majority held
that the Trial Chamber failed to explain
how the conclusion that Renzaho gave an
order to kill Tutsis at roadblocks was the
only reasonable inference to draw from
the evidence. Furthermore, the majority
noted, the conclusion that Renzaho gave
an order to kill at the roadblocks would
be an insufficient basis on which to base
a conviction for ordering, as the Trial
Chamber made no findings “concerning
when or where Renzaho gave the order, to
whom or to what category of perpetrators
he gave the order, and whether Renzaho
was in a position of authority vis-à-vis
the recipient.” Hence, while upholding the

INTERNATIONALIZED TRIBUNALS
THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL FOR LEBANON
DEFINES TERRORISM
On May 30, 2007, the United Nations,
by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1757,
convened the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
(STL) to prosecute individuals accused of
committing the attacks on February 14,
2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri and others. Article
2 of Resolution 1757 specified that the
tribunal must apply the Lebanese Criminal
Code for crimes of terrorism. Although the
STL is mandated to apply Lebanese law in
its proceedings, the Appeals Chamber of
the STL issued an interlocutory decision
in which it held that the STL could apply
international law related to the definition of terrorism to which Lebanon is
bound. The Appeals Chamber referenced
the Arab Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorism (Convention), articulated a
customary international definition of terrorism, and explained how the STL is not

Trial Chamber’s conviction of Renzaho
of genocide based on aiding and abetting
the killings at the roadblocks, the majority
reversed the lower court’s conviction for
genocide based on ordering these same
killings.
Judge Güney and Judge Pocar dissented on this point. Judge Güney stated
that although he agreed that the conviction
was not secured for reasons put forth by
the majority, he believed that other factual
findings in the Trial Judgment supported
the conviction of genocide for ordering the
killing at roadblocks. He argued that the
Trial Chamber found “beyond reasonable
doubt” that Renzaho ordered the establishment of roadblocks during April 1994, was
aware of the likelihood that killings would
be committed there, and shared the “genocidal intent of the assailants at roadblocks.”
For his part, Judge Pocar disagreed with
both the reasoning and the conclusion
of the majority opinion. He believed the
majority ignored the fact that Renzaho
ordered the establishment of roadblocks
and made other public statements knowing
that the continued killing of Tutsis was a
likely outcome. Based on these facts, Judge
Pocar stated that the Trial Chamber determined that Renzaho acted with knowledge

limited by Lebanese case law as it applies
the Lebanese Criminal Code related to terrorism. This is the first internationalized
tribunal to try crimes of terrorism. Thus,
the decisions regarding what constitutes a
crime of terrorism could impact how other
countries prosecute individuals accused of
committing acts of terrorism.
Article 314 of the Lebanese Criminal
Code defines terrorist acts as “acts intended
to cause a state of terror and committed by
means liable to create a public danger
such as explosive devices, inflammable
materials, toxic or corrosive products and
infectious or microbial agents.” Thus, the
Lebanese code narrowly defines a terrorist act as one requiring use of some means
likely to create a public danger. For example, a murder committed with the intention to terrorize the population may not
meet the statute’s requirements if the court
decides that the means used did not create
a public danger.
In articulating international definitions
of terrorism, the STL looks to the Arab
42

of the genocidal intent of the assailants at
roadblocks, an intent Renzaho also shared,
and had not erred in its conviction of
Renzaho based on his role in ordering the
killings of Tutsis at roadblocks.
In terms of sentencing, the Appeals
Chamber noted that its reversals of the
Trial Chamber’s convictions for genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes
based on acts of rape and for genocide
based on the ordering of killings of Tutsis
at roadblocks “concern[ed] very serious crimes” and that, in some cases, the
Appeals Chamber has “considered reversals as reason to review and reduce the
sentence.” However, noting that it had
affirmed Renzaho’s convictions for genocide, murder as a crime against humanity,
and murder as a war crime based on other
acts, the Appeals Chamber concluded that
its reversals did not impact the sentence
imposed by the Trial Chamber.
Yaritza Velez, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, wrote this judgment summary
for the Human Rights Brief. Katherine
Anne Cleary, Assistant Director of the War
Crimes Research Office, edited this summary for the Human Rights Brief.

Convention, to which Lebanon is a State
Party, as well as customary international
law. The Convention does not specify the
means of a terrorist act, but does assert
that the act must be violent in nature. The
STL then turns to other international law
to articulate a customary definition of
terrorism by looking to state practice and
international treaties. The STL states that,
through the lens of customary international
law, an act is considered terrorism if, in
times of peace, the actor creates a public
danger with the intent to spread fear, and
the act has a transnational element or
effect. By bringing the Lebanese and international definitions of terrorism together,
and by regarding the list of means enumerated in the Lebanese Criminal Code as
non-inclusive, the court broadly interprets
Lebanon’s means requirement. Lebanon’s
requirement of a danger to the public is
still part of the definition of a terrorist act
that the STL will apply, but the danger created need not arise from the specific means
used to commit the terrorist act. Rather, the
danger can be the violence that the act has
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the potential to encourage and create. Thus,
the STL will interpret an act of terrorism to
require an intentional commission of an act
through any means likely to create a public
danger, and the intent to create and cause a
state of fear and terror.
While the STL has yet to hear a case,
its interlocutory decision defining terrorism and subsequent cases applying this
definition could have a lasting impact
both in Lebanon and the greater international community. As this will be the first
instance in which an act of terrorism is
tried in an internationalized venue, the
future opinions issued by the STL could
become important persuasive authority for
other Lebanese courts, and for other international and domestic courts, prosecuting
acts of terrorism. The international community has struggled to clearly define
terrorism, and has instead relied on various
anti-terrorism conventions. The definition
of terrorism articulated by the STL could
serve as a “gap filler” for other international bodies as they also wrestle with the
challenge of defining terrorism and the
legal consequences of such a definition.
As trials commence, the application of
the STL’s definition will further clarify the
legal requirements of terrorism, and the
ramifications for both the prosecution and
defense.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE ECCC: FITNESS
TO STAND TRIAL DELAYS CASE 002
The Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) is currently
conducting a series of hearings regarding
the fitness to stand trial of some of the
defendants in Case 002. Case 002 involves
four leaders from the Khmer Rouge regime
of 1975 to 1979, Noun Chea, Ieng Sary,
Khieu Samphan, and Ieng Thirith. They
have been indicted on multiple charges,
including crimes against humanity and
genocide. The court’s review of Noun
Chea, Ieng Sary, and Ieng Thirith’s fitness
to stand trial has significantly delayed the
start of the trial. While a defendant has a
right to be able to competently participate
in his or her trial, the inability to try violators of human rights due to health concerns
may undermine victims’ access to justice.
Rule 81 of the ECCC states that the
defendant has a right to be present at his
or her trial. Furthermore, the Cambodian
Constitution embraces the UN International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

which requires in Article 14 that defendants
be able to participate in their own trial. A
defendant who is mentally or physically
incapable cannot stand trial. The ECCC
has ruled that a defendant may request
a health evaluation, as per Prosecutor v.
Strugar, a decision of the Trial Chamber of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In Strugar, the
ICTY held that a certain level of mental
cognizance is required for a defendant to
“effectively exercise” his procedural rights.
Thus, the purpose of these fitness hearings
is to determine if a defendant can stand
trial. If the court finds the defendant unfit,
the decisions of the ICTY can help guide
the court in determining how to handle
permanently unfit defendants.
Concerns regarding the defendants’
health were first raised in March 2008
when Noun Chea requested the appointment of an expert to gauge his fitness to
stand trial. The court denied this motion on
the grounds that the defense did not present
enough evidence to warrant the appointment of an expert. Internal Rule 32 of the
ECCC states that the court may appoint
an expert to determine if a defendant is
“physically and mentally fit to stand trial”
because the defendant has a procedural
right to be capable of understanding and
present for the litigation.
In 2011, Noun Chea, joined with Ieng
Thirith and Ieng Sary, again requested the
appointment of an expert to evaluate their
fitness to stand trial. The order was granted
and Dr. John Campbell, a geriatrician from
New Zealand, evaluated the health and fitness of both Ieng Thirith and Noun Chea,
while Ieng Sary was denied an evaluation.
Dr. John Campbell examined Noun Chea
and Ieng Thirith and appeared before the
court from August 29 – August 31, 2011
to answer questions. While the court has
yet to make a final decision on both defendants, Dr. Campbell’s findings will likely
weigh heavily in the decision because of
the ECCC’s inability to conduct its own
thorough health assessment with a full
understanding of the medical issues.
Dr. Campbell’s report found Noun Chea
fit to stand trial. However, it is likely that
the defense will continue to raise health
concerns regarding his mental and physical ability. Dr. Campbell’s report on Ieng
Thirith states that she is likely suffering from Alzheimer’s disease and shortterm memory loss, and recommends that
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she undergo further psychiatric testing to
determine if she is fit to stand trial. He
does not think she is currently fit to stand
trial, and he believes she is unlikely to
improve. Once affirmed by the Supreme
Court Chamber, a decision that a defendant
is unfit to stand trial is final and terminates
proceedings against the defendant. Thus,
there is a substantial likelihood that Ieng
Thirith’s trial will never progress past the
pre-trial stage.
If Ieng Thirith is declared permanently
unfit, the ECCC will face a unique decision, with jurisprudential repercussions
not merely for the ECCC itself, but for
the entire international criminal justice
landscape. Unlike in Strugar, where the
defendant declared unfit died three months
later from terminal cancer, Ieng Thirith’s
Alzheimer’s is permanent, but not terminal; she could survive for years rather
than months. If unfit, the court is likely
to release her to a health facility or to her
family, with restrictions placed on her
movement. However, it is possible she will
outlive the mandate of the ECCC, in which
case it is unclear if any potential restrictions placed on her would continue to have
a legal effect.
The trial against all four defendants
will start in late November. However, if
proceedings against Ieng Thirith are halted,
there may be no redress for the victims
of Khmer Rouge’s brutal regime, many
of whom continue to suffer from health
issues. Many victims of the Khmer Rouge
are in a similar physical and mental condition as Ieng Thirith but do not have access
to the same standard of health care. While
it is important to balance the rights of the
defendant, it is important not to lose sight
of the fact that these defendants allegedly
led a brutal, genocidal regime whose victims are still suffering ill consequences.
While the ECCC strives to respect the
rights of the defendants, justice for the
victims should not be forgotten.
Michelle Flash, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College
of Law, covers the Internationalized
Tribunals for the Human Rights Brief.

